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CAMERAS IN THE COURTROOM AND DUE
PROCESS: A PROPOSAL FOR A QUALITATIVE
DIFFERENCE TEST
Jeremy Cohen*
In 1965 United States Supreme Court Justice John Harlan said:
Permitting television in the courtroom undeniably has mischievous potenti-
alities for intruding upon the detached atmosphere which should always sur-
round the judicial process. Forbidding this innovation, however, would
doubtless impinge upon one of the valued attributes of our federalism by
preventing the States from pursuing a novel course of procedural experi-
mentation.I
Fifteen years later, in Chandler v. Florida,2 the Supreme Court reaf-
firmed Justice Harlan's view by emphasizing the role of federalism in
permitting televised trials. Today it is not unusual to see on the local eve-
ning news portions of criminal trials conducted only hours earlier. Wash-
ington and thirty-four other states permit the electronic media to film and
at times even broadcast live coverage of trials.3 Nevertheless, the concern
voiced by Justice Harlan-that a trial may be compromised when cam-
eras intrude into the solemnity of the courtroom-continues to linger.
The issue of cameras in the courtroom is at a crossroads. Many crimi-
nal defendants tried in the presence of the electronic media have claimed
that they were denied due process, yet neither the Washington courts nor
the federal courts have adequately defined the standards under which
these claims will be evaluated. This failure to reach a definition has left
the courts unable to state why cameras will be permitted at one trial and
not at another.
Creating standards to determine when the presence of cameras denies a
defendant due process is not an easy task. The most promising judicial
approach to emerge is the "qualitative difference test." This test recog-
nizes that the presence of cameras at a trial holds the potential to alter the
* Ph.D. candidate and lecturer, University of Washington School of Communications; B.A.,
1973, San Francisco State University; M.A., 1979, University of Southern California.
1. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 587 (1965) (concurring opinion).
2. 449U.S.560(1981).
3. As of September, 1981, 23 states allowed broadcast coverage of both trial and appellate pro-
ceedings; two states allowed broadcast coverage of trial proceedings only; six states allowed broad-
cast coverage of appellate proceedings only; five states had programs pending that would allow for
some degree of courtroom broadcasting; and 15 states had no existing program of courtroom elec-
tronic media coverage. THE NEws MEDIA & THE LAW, Oct.-Nov. 1981, at 64.
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conduct or outcome of a trial. 4 This test originated in the Florida courts, 5
and is still in its infancy. The qualitative difference test does not yet ade-
quately define or provide a substantive standard courts can rely on to
make consistent decisions. Further development is needed before a quali-
tative difference test can offer governing principles.
This comment first reviews the federal law on the role of due process in
deciding whether to allow cameras in court. The Washington and Florida
experiences with cameras in the courtroom are then examined in an at-
tempt to add substance to the constitutional threshold. By placing the en-
tire issue in the proper context we can chart a course of action that will
lead to a useful and workable resolution of lingering problems.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL THRESHOLD: ESTES AND
CHANDLER
In analyzing the constitutional effects of electronic media trial cover-
age, it is important to distinguish between the problems associated with
exposing trial participants to extrajudicial evidence and the possibility
that a trial will be affected by the presence of cameras in the courtroom.
Courts in the United States long ago showed concern for the possibility
that certain actions of the press might interfere with the judicial process.
A major concern of the courts has been that media coverage of arrests and
trials may create prejudice capable of denying defendants their sixth
amendment right to a fair trial. 6 Chief Justice John Marshall noted during
4. See generally part IV infra (discussing the "qualitative difference" test).
5. See notes 42-54 and accompanying text infra.
6. There are many sensational cases, marked by abuses of both press and court officials. that
have led to prejudicial publicity. E.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966): Rideau v. Louisi-
ana. 373 U.S. 723 (1963); Irvin v. Dowd. 366 U.S. 717 (1961); Pennekamp v. Florida. 328 U.S. 331
(1946). Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976). is a landmark case that sets guidelines
for excluding the print and broadcast media from trials. Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952).
provides a telling example of prejudicial publicity. Stroble was accused of murdering a six-year-old
girl with an ice pick. Serious questions of prejudicial publicity arose when the district attorney re-
leased a pre-trial confession to the press and news stories described the defendant as a "'werewolf." a
"fiend,'" and a "sex-mad killer." Id. at 192. The press also quoted the prosecutor as saying that sex
offenders should be done away with in the same fashion as mad dogs. Id. at 192-93. Stroble is an
extreme example. but it underscores a point. The problem in the free-press/fair-trial issue is the po-
tential of bias from jurors, witnesses, and other trial participants exposed to extrajudicial evidence in
the press. The problem is not the presence of media in the courtroom. The free-press/fair-trial issue
continues to plague the media and the courts. See Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia. 448 U.S. 555
(1980) (the press has a first amendment right to attend trials): Gannett v. DePasquale. 443 U.S. 368
(1979) (the right to a pre-trial hearing open to the public belongs to the defendant, not to the press).
The problem has also been recently litigated in Washington. See Federated Publications v. Swedberg.
96 Wn. 2d 13, 633 P.2d 74 (1981) (trial court may impose reasonable restrictions upon news media at
pre-trial hearing in criminal case, including compelling persons attending to agree to abide by Bench-
Bar-Press guidelines).
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the 1807 treason trial of Aaron Burr that the press was capable of contam-
inating the jury with "strong and deep impressions which will close the
mind against the testimony that may be offered." 7
The introduction in the twentieth century of both photography and
broadcasting posed the potential of aggravating the free-press/fair-trial
problems referred to by Chief Justice Marshall. But the growth of photog-
raphy and broadcasting created a different issue from that posed by the
printed word. Courtroom photography brought no assertions that poten-
tial jurors might be exposed to prejudicial pretrial publicity. Instead, the
question arose whether the broadcast media with their sometimes obtru-
sive equipment might in some way disrupt the trial process itself and alter
its outcome. This issue is not the traditional free-press/fair-trial dilemma.
The question is whether photographic and recording equipment have
some effect on trial participants capable of denying a defendant due pro-
cess.
Communications reseacher Michael Novak wrote in 1974:
For twenty-five years we have been immersed in a medium never before
experienced on this earth. We can be forgiven if we do not yet understand
all the ways in which this medium has altered us, particularly our inner
selves: the perceiving, mythic, symbolic-and the judging, critical-parts
of ourselves. 8
Novak's coficerns echo the muddled response to the issue of cameras in
the courtroom that arose from the Supreme Court in 1965 in Estes v.
Texas.9 In that case, salad-oil magnate Billie Sol Estes, a prominent citi-
zen of the Lone Star State, was involved in a scandal that included links
to federal government officials. The resulting prosecution received con-
siderable attention from the media. Texas was one of the only states at the
time to allow cameras into criminal trials. Twelve television-camera op-
erators crowded into the tiny courtroom where Estes was tried. Estes ap-
pealed his fraud conviction, arguing that the presence of cameras at his
trial created a denial of due process. ' 0
Estes provided the Supreme Court its first opportunity to consider the
cameras in the courtroom issue in a context devoid of traditional free-
press/fair-trial questions. Implicit in the case was the Court's first chance
to set a standard to identify due process limitations on the use of cameras
in the courtroom, but the Court's decision left the problem unsettled. The
7. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 51 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14, 692g).
8. Novak, Television Shapes the Soul, in TELEVISION ASA SOCIAL FORCE 9, 9 (1975).
9. 381 U.S. 532(1965).
10. Severe criticism of electronic media in Estes centered on purely technical problems that
caused distractions, such as cumbersome equipment, distractive lighting, and numerous camera tech-
nicians. Id. at 568 (Warren, C.J., concurring); see Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 576 (1981).
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Court was widely split in its reasoning. Five Justices agreed that Estes
was denied due process by the presence of cameras at his trial, but Justice
Clark's opinion for the Court was joined without reservation by only three
Justices. II
Chief Justice Warren's concurring opinion in Estes called for a com-
plete ban: "The record in this case presents a vivid illustration of the in-
herent prejudice of televised criminal trials and supports our conclusion
that this is the appropriate time to make a definite appraisal of television
in the courtroom." 12 Justice Harlan, however, was not ready to go as far
as Warren and in supplying the crucial fifth vote stated: "[T]he day may
come when television will have become so commonplace an affair in the
daily life of the average person as to dissipate all reasonable likelihood
that its use in courtrooms may disparage the judicial process." 13 Justice
Stewart's dissent also left open the door for reconsidering the possibility
of televising trials. 14
The cameras in the courtroom issue appeared before the Court again in
1981 in Chandler v. Florida. 15 Chandler involved the appeal of two Mi-
ami policemen who were convicted of burglary in a Florida court. The
case had aroused public attention, and the defendants requested at the
outset of their trial that cameras be banned. Based on Canon 3A(7) of the
Florida Code of Judicial Conduct 16 the trial court denied the request. The
defendants appealed, claiming that the presence of cameras had denied
them due process. 17
Chief Justice Burger formulated the question narrowly: "[W]hether,
consistent with constitutional guarantees, a state may provide for radio,
I1. See 381 U.S. at 591 (Harlan, J., concurring). The three members of the Court who unres-
ervedly joined Justice Clark's opinion did so through a separate concurring opinion authored by Chief
Justice Warren.
12. Id. at 552.
13. Id. at 595 (concurring opinion).
14. Justice Stewart stated: '1 would be wary of imposing any per se rule which, in the light of
future technology, might serve to stifle or abridge true First Amendment rights." hi. at 604. Despite
Stewart's reference to first amendment rights, cases involving cameras in the courtroom have been
decided on grounds of federalism rather than press freedom. E.g., Chandler v. Florida. 449 U.S. 560
(1981). Contra Burger Court Criticizedfor First Amendment Views, 7 MEItA L. REP. (BNA) No. 34.
at inside back cover (Dec. 1, 1981) (arguing Court should have used Chandler to establish a first
amendment right to broadcast trials); cf. Cable News Network v. ABC. 518 F. Supp. 1238, 1244
(N.D. Ga. 1981) ("there does exist a limited right of the public and the press, under the First Amend-
ment, to access to information concerning governmental activities").
15. 449U.S.560(1981l).
16. Canon 3A(7), which allows broadcast coverage, was amended by the Florida Supreme Court
in In re Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida, Inc., 370 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1979). See generally note 39
infra (discussing Canon 3A(7)).
17. The Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed the convictions and the Florida Supreme Court
denied review, reasoning that it had already spoken on the issue of cameras in the courtroom in In re
Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida, Inc., 370 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1979). 449 U.S. at 568-69.
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television, and still photographic coverage of a criminal trial for public
broadcast, notwithstanding the objection of the accused." 18 The first ar-
gument of the defendants was that Estes banned cameras in the courtroom
as a per se violation of due process rights. 19 The defendants' second argu-
ment was that, even if Estes did not create a per se rule, in the defendants'
case the presence of cameras was a denial of due process.20
Chief Justice Burger answered the first argument by pointing out that
because Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Estes had been limited to
the facts of that case, the Estes Court had neither adopted a permanent
ban on cameras in the courtroom, nor held that cameras were a per se
violation of due process rights. 21 The Chandler Court also refused to find
that cameras in the courtroom were a per se violation of the defendants'
constitutional rights. 22 The Court explained that absent such a constitu-
tional question, the concept of federalism insured the states the right to
experiment within the judicial process. Chief Justice Burger stated, "We
are not empowered by the Constitution to oversee or harness state
procedural experimentation; only when the state action infringes funda-
mental guarantees are we authorized to intervene.' '23 Under Chandler,
and consistent with the concept of federalism, it is therefore up to the
states, not the federal government, to decide whether to allow courtroom
photography and broadcasting. 24
States that allow cameras in the courtroom, however, continue to face
the second possibility, raised in both Estes and Chandler, that in a given
case due process rights may be violated. The Court in Chandler found
that the defendants had made no specific showing of prejudice to their
rights. 25 Chief Justice Burger said the defendants had not attempted to
show with sufficient "specificity that the presence of cameras impaired
the ability of the jurors to decide the case on only the evidence before
them or that their trial was affected adversely by the impact on any of the
participants of the presence of cameras and the prospect of broadcast." 26
18. 449U.S.at562.
19. Id. at 570.
20. Id. at 581.
21. Id. at 572-74. Chief Justice Burger felt that, because Justice Harlan provided the fifth vote
necessary in support of the Estes judgment, "[a] careful analysis of Justice Harlan's opinion is there-
fore fundamental to an understanding of the ultimate holding of Estes." Id. at 571.
22. Id. at 582-83.
23. Id. at 582.
24. Less than two weeks after the Chandler decision, the Maryland House of Delegates voted by
a margin of almost three to one to discontinue the state's program of cameras in the courtroom. Wash.
Post, Feb. 18, 1981, at C4, col. 1; see also Abrahams, New Efforts in 17 States to Expand Camera
Coverage of Courts, 65 JUDICATURE 116, 118 (1981) (noting the Maryland legislative action).
25. 449 U.S. at 581-82.
26. Id.at 581.
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The Court did not define the parameters of such necessary "specific-
ity." Undoubtedly, there are constitutional limitations on the presence of
cameras in court. For the time being, however, Chandler has left it up to
each state to devise court procedures that will not violate these limita-
tions. In the words of Chief Justice Burger, "[U]nless we were to con-
clude that television coverage under all conditions is prohibited by the
Constitution. the states must be free to experiment. . . .We must as-
sume state courts will be alert to any factors that impair the fundamental
rights of the accused." 27
II. CAMERAS IN THE COURTROOM IN WASHINGTON
Washington's experience with cameras in the courtroom predates
Chandler by a number of years. In 1963 a group consisting of lawyers.
judges, law-enforcement officers, and representatives of the news media
formed the Bench-Bar-Press Committee of Washington. 28 In 1973 the
Committee asked the Washington Supreme Court to lift temporarily the
ban on cameras in the courtroom. 29 The court found merit in the request
and approved a limited program of courtroom photography on an experi-
mental basis. 30 After evaluating the experimental program. Canon 3A(7)
27. Id. at 582. For a detailed discussion of the history of the cameras-in-the-courtroom issue, see
Kelso & Pawluc, Focus on Cameras in the Courtroom: The Florida LErperience. The California
Experiment. and the Pending Decision in Chandler v. Florida. 12 PAC. L.J. 1 (1980); Stephen. Cam-
eras in Courtrooms in Florida. 1979 JOURNALISM Q. 703: Zimmerman, Overcoming Future Shock:
Estes Revisited, or a Modest Proposal for the Constitutional Protection of the News-gathering Pro-
cess. 1980 DUKE L.J. 641. Recent discussions of Chandler v. Florida include: Beisman. In the Wake
of Chandler v. Florida: A Comprehensive Approach to the Implementation of Cameras in the Court-
room. 33 FED. Cost. L.J. 17 (1981): Pequignot, From Estes to Chandler: Shifting the Constitutional
Burden of Courtroot Cameras to the States. 9 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 315 (1981).
28. The purpose of the committee is to "'foster better understanding .. . and to seek accom-
modations between the constitutional rights of free trial and free press." Principles and Guidelines of
the Bench-Bar-Press Committee of Washington I (on file with the Washington Law Rerien)
[hereinafter cited as Bench-Bar-Press Principles and Guidelines]. The Committee explores concerns
and suggests non-binding solutions to issues of concern to the bar. the judiciary and the media of
Washington. See notes 32. 34 & 39 infra. Membership in the original committee included representa-
tives from the Washington State Supreme Court, Washington State Court of Appeals. Federal Judici-
ary in Washington, Superior Court Judges' Association, Washington State Magistrates' Association.
Washington State Bar Association, Allied Daily Newspapers of Washington, Washington Newspaper
Publishers Association. Washington State Association of Broadcasters, Associated Press. United
Press International. University of Washington School of Communications. Washington State Prose-
cuting Attorneys' Association. Washington Association of Sheriffs and Chiefs of Police, and Wash-
ington State Board of Prison Terms and Paroles. Bench-Bar-Press Principles and Guidelines. supra.
at 1-2.
29. Memorandum to Bench-Bar-Press Committee of Washington on Cameras in the Courtroom
(Oct. 28. 1981) (on file with the Washington Law Review).
30. The Washington Supreme Court adopted the Committee's recommendation and a test case.
State v. Fetter. Crim. No. 69-484 (King County Super. Ct. Dec. 2. 1974), was selected. Under
prearranged ground rules, the court allowed Seattle television stations to test various film and record-
Vol. 57:277, 1982
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of the Washington Code of Judicial Conduct was revised to permit cam-
eras in the courtroom at the discretion of the trial judge. 31 Under the mod-
ified canon the media are required to secure the permission of the trial
judge prior to photographing or broadcasting trials. The permission of
witnesses, defendants, jurors and other parties to a trial is not necessary,
although individuals may prevent their own pictures from being taken if
they object in advance. 32
In 1981 the Washington Court of Appeals decided State v. Wixon, 33 the
first review of the cameras-in-the-courtroom issue by a Washington ap-
pellate court since the United States Supreme Court decided Chandler.
Todd James Wixon and Steven Earl Brown were tried for murder. The
victim was a prominent Seattle citizen whose body was found in the
locked trunk of a car. When the trial began, the judge granted permission
to the media, over the objections of the defendants, to bring their cameras
into the courtroom. 34 Despite all the trappings of a Raymond Chandler
ing equipment during the course of the trial as long as there was no interference with the proceedings.
The University of Washington supplied the only stationary video camera at the trial. Neither live
coverage nor film or videotape of the Fetter proceedings was ever broadcast to the public. At the
trial's conclusion, representatives of the court and the Bench-Bar-Press Committee conducted inter-
views with various participants and observers and prepared a final report.
31. WASH. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3A(7) now states:
A judge may permit broadcasting, televising, recording, and taking photographs in the court-
room during sessions of the court, including recesses between sessions, under the following
conditions:
(a) Permission shall have first been expressly granted by the judge and under such conditions
as the judge may prescribe;
(b) The media personnel will not distract participants or impair the dignity of the proceed-
ings; and
(c) No witness, juror or party who expresses any prior objection to the judge shall be photo-
graphed nor shall the testimony of such a witness, juror or party be broadcast or telecast.
32. The language of Canon 3A(7)(c) holds the potential for misinterpretation. A November 10,
1981 report of the Bench-Bar-Press Committee of Washington' states: "Unfortunately, some trial
judges have construed the permissive nature of Canon 3A(7) to mean that consent of the parties is
necessary [before broadcasting may be allowed at trials], which it is not." Recent Actions By Bench-
Bar-Press Committee Concerning Coverage of Judicial Proceedings 2 (Nov. 10, 1981) (on file with
the Washington Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Bench-Bar-Press Recent Actions]. The language of
Canon 3A(7)(c) could appear on its face to mean that parties to a trial, including the defendant, can
veto the judge's decision to allow broadcasting from the courtroom. However, a member of the
Bench-Bar-Press Committee recently stated that the intent of Canon 3A(7) was only to afford "par-
ties, witnesses and jurors the option of objecting to the training of cameras on them personally."
Minutes of Bench-Bar-Press Committee of Washington 2 (Nov. 7, 1981) (on file with the Washington
Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Bench-Bar-Press Minutes]. See note 34 infra.
33. 30Wn. App. 63,631 P.2d 1033 (1981).
34. No photographs were taken of the defendants, but cameras were allowed to focus on other
participants at the trial. The Wixon court did not address directly the contention that the defendants'
permission was required before any photographs of the trial could be taken, but the conclusion is
unavoidable that a defendant's permission is not required before other portions of a trial may be
filmed. The court held that the defendants were not denied due process by the presence of cameras
photographing others at the trial. By implicitly approving of the mere presence of cameras despite the
Washington Law Review Vol. 57:277. 1982
mystery novel, the trial judge found the reporting by the Seattle media of
both the arrests and the trial to be "factual and neither sensational nor
inflammatory. " 35 Nevertheless, the defendants claimed that because the
trial judge had allowed cameras in the courtroom over their objection,
they had been denied due process. 36
The court of appeals disagreed. The court applied Chandler and held
that absent a specific showing of a denial of due process to the defen-
dants, the state may allow broadcast coverage of criminal trials. The de-
fendants in Wixon, like the defendants in Chandler, had failed to show a
specific denial of their due process rights. 37
III. ANALYSIS
Wixon is Washington's affirmation of the Chandler holding and makes
it clear that broadcast coverage of criminal trials in Washington will not in
and of itself be seen as a threat to a fair trial. Chandler could not establish
that holding for Washington because Chandler does not require a state to
permit broadcasting of criminal trials. 38 Washington's decision to allow
cameras in the courtroom is Washington's alone, and is consistent with a
reading of Chandler as a case dealing primarily with federalism. But
defendants' objections, the court of appeals' interpretation of Canon 3A(7) is consistent with the
original intent of the Canon as recently stated by a member of the Bench-Bar-Press Committee. See
note 32 supra. Nevertheless, some members of the Committee continue to fear future misinterpreta-
tions. and at the Committee's November 7. 1981 meeting a motion was adopted to add the following
language to Canon 3A(7)(c): "Notwithstanding such objection, the judge may allow the broadcast-
ing. televising, recording or photographing of any other portion of the proceedings." Bench-Bar-
Press Recent Actions. supra note 32. at 2.
35. 30 Wn. App. at 68, 631 P.2d at 1038.
36. A free-press/fair-trial issue was also raised by defendant Wixon's contention that the trial
judge erred when he did not grant a change of venue due to prejudicial publicity. The court rejected
this argument noting that "'Iflollowing individual voir dire, the trial judge denied the motion based
upon his evaluation of the nature of the publicity, the selection of an apparently unbiased jury. and
the benefits and burdens to the parties of granting a change of venue." Id. at 66-67. 631 P.2d at
1037.
37. The Wtxon court stated:
Here. neither Wixon nor Brown has offered any evidence that the televising of thetr trials
impaired the ability of the jurors to decide the case on the basis of the evidence presented or that
the trial was affected adversely by the impact of the broadcasters' presence on any of the partici-
pants.
Id. at 73, 631 P.2d at 1040.
38. Justice White's concurring opinion in ChanIdler stresses this point:
I agree that those risks [associated with cameras in the courtroom] are real and should not be
permitted to develop into the reality of an unfair trial. Nor does the decision today, as I under-
stand it. suggest that any State is any less free than it was to avoid this hazard by not permitting a
trial to be televised over the objection of the defendant or by forbidding cameras in its court-
rooms in any criminal case.
Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560. 589 (1981).
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Wixon is more than a simple reaffirmation of federalism. Wixon also de-
monstrates the need for standards that identify conditions under which
cameras in the courtroom do violate due process. Neither Chandler nor
Wixon provides those standards.
The need for standards is particularly acute in Washington because the
decision whether to permit courtroom broadcasting is left entirely to the
trial judge's discretion. Canon 3A(7) of the Washington Code of Judicial
Conduct states: "A judge may permit broadcasting, televising, recording,
and taking photographs in the courtroom . . . . 39 Only with advance
permission of the trial judge, secured with each new case, may the media
bring broadcast and photographic equipment into Washington courts. It
is, therefore, more accurate in Washington to speak of a privilege to
broadcast and photograph trials than of a right to do so.
One need not favor trial broadcasting to appreciate the need for a con-
sistent approach to balancing the desirability of electronic media coverage
against the possibility of an unfair trial. Without a consistent approach,
trial judges must base their decisions on little more than visceral feelings
about cameras in the courtroom. If they decide to close their courtrooms
the goal of increasing public awareness of the judicial process is frus-
trated. But when judges decide to open their courtrooms to broadcasting,
the absence of a well-defined standard increases the likelihood that defen-
dants will appeal those decisions. 40
39. (Emphasis added). The Washington Canon is different from the Florida Canon approved by
the United States Supreme Court in Chandler. Florida Canon 3A(7) states, in part:
Subject at all times to the authority of the presiding judge to (i) control the conduct of pro-
ceedings before the court, (ii) ensure decorum and prevent distractions, and (iii) ensure the fair
administration of justice in the pending cause, electronic media and still photography coverage
of public judicial proceedings in the appellate and trial courts of this state shall be allowed in
accordance with standards of conduct and technology promulgated by the Supreme Court of
Florida.
FLA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3A(7) (emphasis added). If a Florida judge wishes to ex-
clude the electronic media, the normal procedure is to first grant an evidentiary hearing to the press.
See State v. Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc., 395 So. 2d 544, 548 (Fla. 1981). Under Washington
Canon 3A(7) a judge is not required to grant a hearing before electronic media are excluded from a
trial. See note 31 supra.
The Subcommittee on Canon 3A(7) to the Bench-Bar-Press Committee of Washington has recog-
nized the differences between the Washington and Florida canons. The Subcommittee considered
"[w]hether Washington CJC 3A(7) should be modified along the lines of the Florida Canon as ap-
proved by the U.S. Supreme Court in Chandler v. Florida," but "recommended against modifica-
tion of Washington's canon to align it with Florida's." Report of Subcommittee on Canon 3A(7) to
Bench-Bar-Press Committee (Nov. 7, 1981) (on file with the Washington Law Review). The full
Committee adopted the Subcommittee's recommendation. Bench-Bar-Press Minutes, supra note 32,
at 2-3.
40. State v. Hansen, Crim. No. 176 (Wahkiakum County Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 1981), illustrates
the problems the vague language of Canon 3A(7) present for the judiciary and the media. The Wahki-
akum County Superior Court granted prior permission to the Longview Daily News and the Wahkia-
kum Eagle to take still photographs at a 1981 first-degree murder trial. In addition, however, the court
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Chandler and Wixon held that a defendant's right to due process is vio-
lated if the defendant can show "some specific evidence that televising
the trial adversely affected the conduct of his trial." 4 1 But the Washington
courts have yet to speak on what such a specific showing must include.
IV. THE QUALITATIVE DIFFERENCE TEST
The experience of the Florida courts in the wake of Chandler provides
useful guidance in developing a qualitative difference test. In March
1981, shortly after Chandler, the Florida Supreme Court announced two
decisions involving cameras in the courtroom. In State v. Pahn Beach
Newspapers, Inc., 42 the media sought review of a trial court order prohi-
biting still photographs, sketches, and television coverage during testi-
mony at a murder trial. 43 The defendant was accused of killing a fellow
inmate at Glades Correctional Institute and was on trial for first-degree
murder. Because the inmates at the prison were allowed to watch televi-
sion and because the defendant feared that his testimony about prison vio-
lence might place him in jeopardy if the prisoners saw televised proceed-
ings of his testimony, the trial court agreed that the defendant's testimony
should not be broadcast. 44
The Florida Supreme Court focused on the standard a court should use
to exclude electronic media from a trial. 45 The court said:
The presiding judge may exclude electronic media coverage of a particular
stipulated that before any photographs of the trial could be published in the newspaper. the film
would have to be submitted to the court for review and approval. At its November 7. 1981 meeting
the Bench-Bar-Press Committee was presented with a report of the Liaison Committee discussing the
Wahkiakum County trial. Bench-Bar-Press Minutes, supra note 32, at 3. The full Committee adopted
this report and accepted the Liaison Committee's recommendation that:
the Bench-Bar-Press Committee recommend to the state's judiciary. media, and the bar that
once the presiding judge has approved cameras (or recording) in the courtroom pursuant to the
court's discretion under Canon 3A(7). the court should not request approval of the materials
recorded or photographed. The reference in subparagraph (c) of Canon 3A(7) to -'prior objec-
tion to the judge" was intended to indicate that no one should have the right of screening re-
corded or photographed materials.
Report of Liaison Committee Concerning Trial Judge Review of Photographs 2 (Nov. 7. 1981) (on
file with the Washington Law Review). There was no suggestion from the Liaison Committee that the
problem was anything more than a misunderstanding and the Committee commended the judge.
counsel, and the involved newspapers for their efforts to communicate and cooperate.
41. Vixon, 30 Wn. App. at 73. 631 P.2d at 1040: see Chandler. 449 U.S. at 575.
42. 395 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1981).
43. Reporters themselves were not barred from the courtroom or prohibited from writing about
the trial. See id. at 546.
44. Id.
45. The court also dealt with a number of technical aspects concerning the Florida requirement
that, barring special circumstances, the media must receive a hearing before cameras may be ex-
cluded from the courtroom. Id. Washington does not require such hearings. See note 39 supra.
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participant only upon a finding that such coverage will have a substantial
effect upon the particular individual which would be qualitatively different
from the effect on members of the public in general and such effect will be
qualitatively different from coverage by other types of media. 46
The key phrase is the reference to an effect caused by the electronic media
that is "qualitatively different from coverage by other types of media."
The court did not, however, explain how to determine when coverage is
"qualitatively different."
The Florida Supreme Court also considered how to shape substantive
standards to identify conditions under which the electronic media may be
excluded from a trial in State v. Green.47 In Green, the electronic media
were allowed to cover a trial over the objections of the defendant. Green,
an attorney, was standing trial for allegedly misappropriating client
funds. Her trial had been postponed for several months after court-ap-
pointed psychiatrists testified at an evidentiary hearing that Green was
incompetent to stand trial because of a nervous condition. When the trial
actually began, her counsel moved to exclude the electronic media and
included a psychiatrist's report that stated "the presence of electronic
media in the courtroom would adversely impact respondent's competency
to stand trial. '"48 Nevertheless, the trial judge allowed the electronic
media to remain.
The Florida district court of appeal overturned Green's conviction and
remanded for a new trial. 49 The Florida Supreme Court affirmed. It found
the "qualitative difference" standard to be the controlling issue in Green.
and went to some length to explain that test. The court noted that the test
"emphasizes that any general effect resulting from public notoriety of the
case will not suffice to trigger electronic media exclusion." ' 50 The court
pointed out that trials have always been intimidating and that "the single
addition of the camera in the courtroom . . . should not increase ten-
sion significantly, given the fact that electronic media will report the pro-
ceedings whether or not its camera is actually in the courtroom.' '51 The
court held that it would not accept "[g]eneral assertions or allegations" 52
as proof of harm, and that "[i]n all instances, a showing must be made
that the prejudice or the special injury resulted solely from the presence of
46. 395 So. 2d at 546-47 (quoting In re Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida, Inc., 370 So. 2d 764,
779 (Fla. 1979)).
47. 395 So. 2d532 (Fla. 1981).
48. Id. at 536.
49. Green v. State, 377 So. 2d 193 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
50. 395 So. 2d at 536.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 538.
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electronic media in the courtroom in a manner which is qualitatively dif-
ferent from that caused by traditional media coverage."53
The Florida qualitative difference test provides useful guidance for
Washington courts in developing standards on which to base the exclu-
sion of electronic media from trials. But the question of what makes a
provable qualitative difference remains unresolved in both Washington
and Florida. Even in Florida the test exists in name only. The Florida
courts used a qualitative difference test in Pahn Beach Newspapers as
grounds for allowing cameras into a courtroom, and in Green as grounds
for finding a denial of due process when cameras were allowed. In these
decisions, however, the Florida courts have gone no further than to make
vague references to "specific showings of evidence" that due process
was violated. The Florida courts have set no criteria that would define
such a specific showing.
The Washington judiciary must develop its own version of a qualitative
difference test. There are at least three criteria that this test should meet.
First, the test must be in keeping with the Washington constitutional man-
date for the open administration of justice 54 by allowing electronic media
in the courtroom while at the same time providing adequate protection for
a defendant's fundamental right to a fair trial. At present, individual
judges in Washington have little to turn to when questions are raised
about either the potential effects of broadcasting trials or, in the case of an
appeal, the actual effects caused by the presence of electronic media. In
either case there is little incentive to risk due process violations in order to
provide for better public access to trials without some consistent means to
actually weigh those risks.
Second, the qualitative difference test must be practical. A court can-
not be expected to spend the time necessary in every new case to conduct
psychological testing of trial participants to determine whether they will
be affected by the presence of cameras. The test must define the type of
evidence that may be used to show that the presence of cameras will deny
a defendant due process. This evidence should be available and applica-
ble in each case within a reasonable amount of time to prevent disruptions
in the judicial process.
Third, the qualitative difference test must be understandable both to the
judiciary and to the media. If it is too explicit its application will be too
limited, and if it is too vague it will only continue the existing confusion
and inconsistency. 55 Journalists and jurists may not always understand or
53. Id.
54. WASII. CONST. art I. § 10 (-Justice in all cases shall be administered openly, and without
unnecessary delay.').
55. See note 40 supra.
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be sensitive to each other's problems. Yet both have a role in ensuring
that the judicial branch of government operates effectively and constitu-
tionally. 56 Therefore it is vital that rules affecting both the press and the
judiciary take into consideration the needs of both institutions.
Accepting these criteria as a place to begin, the next step is to identify
and define the concepts that underlie the notion of qualitative difference.
What shall the test be and how shall it be applied? First, the courts devel-
oping the test must identify the "difference" brought about by the pres-
ence of electronic media; in other words, the courts must identify the kind
of psychological effect the media will have at a trial. 57 Does the presence
of cameras cause people to change their behavior? Do cameras cause trial
participants to pay attention to something other than the trial, perhaps
because they are thinking about coverage on the evening news that will be
seen by family, friends or business associates? These are questions about
human behavior that can be tested empirically, and this testing should
help to reveal under what circumstances the presence of cameras at a trial
causes changes in behavior.
Once courts have identified when the presence of cameras will cause a
change in behavior, they must turn to the notion of "qualitative." Cam-
eras may indeed have some effect upon behavior in a courtroom, but is
that effect of such a quality that it interferes with the judicial process?
Even assuming that cameras can and do interfere with the judicial pro-
cess, we need to know at what point that interference becomes a denial of
due process. In essence, there is some threshold of interference caused by
cameras in the courtroom beyond which there is a qualitative difference in
the judicial process. Until this threshold can be identified, judges will
continue to apply visceral standards that may give unnecessary weight to
due process considerations when they are balanced against the need to
expand public awareness of the judicial process.
Both of these factors-identifying changes in behavior and identifying
a threshold of interference-involve phenomena that are essentially be-
havioral in nature. The context is certainly that of the law, but the courts
should not overlook the necessity of basing a jurisprudential qualitative
difference test at least in part on information more likely to come from
social scientists than from lawyers. 58
56. It has long been accepted that the press has a watchdog role in guarding against abuses by the
judicial branch of government. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569
(1980).
57. See State v. Green, 395 So. 2d 532, 536-37 (Fla. 1981).
58. This should not be cause for alarm. Both law and social science have made quantum ad-
vances since Sir Henry Maine commented three-quarters of a century ago: "The inquiries of the jurist
are in truth prosecuted much as inquiry in physics and physiology was prosecuted before observation
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Using an interdisciplinary approach to develop a qualitative difference
test would not be the first pairing of the behavioral and legal professions
to find answers to questions of joint concern. Similar work has been done
in the areas of free-press/fair-trial, 59 juries, 60 and, most recently, the two
professions have joined forces to explore the use of videotape in trials. 6'
The point is that by working in conjunction, the legal profession and so-
cial scientists have the opportunity to bring order to a perplexing set of
problems.
V. CONCLUSION
We are only now at the point where the need for standards to resolve
the question of cameras in the courtroom has been identified. Lawyers,
like scientists, operate best when they work with a well-formulated ques-
tion. But a great deal of work remains before a satisfactory solution can
be reached. Cameras are already in courtrooms and temporary solutions
are required when due process issues meet head-on with the desire to
open up the courts by permitting televised and photographic coverage of
trials. But the temporary solutions should not be allowed to become per-
manent.
The case law and the judicial rules that now surround the televising of
Washington trials are inconsistent and insufficient to meet either the needs
of the judicial process and its participants or the needs of the media and
the public. Some courts have begun to rely on the concept of qualitative
difference and while that concept may be a good one, the qualitative dif-
ference test does not yet provide a substantive standard. The test merely
alludes to a standard. In its current form the qualitative difference test can
provide the judiciary with little more than a quasi-rationale upon which to
defend visceral decisions.
A well-formulated test would serve the judiciary, the press, and the
public by accomplishing two tasks. First, the test would give judges sub-
stantive criteria by which to weigh media requests to televise trials. Sec-
ond, the test would provide clear standards for judges deciding appeals by
defendants who claim their due process rights were violated by the pres-
ence of cameras in the courtroom.
had taken the place of assumption." H. MAINE. ANCIENT LAW 3 (10th ed. 1906). quoted in Kaplan.
Behavioral Science and the Law, 19 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 57, 57 (1967).
59. E.g., F. SIEBERT, W. WILCOX. G. HOUGH III & C. BUSH. FREE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL
(1970).
60. E.g.. H. KALVEN, JR. & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966).
61. See Bermant. Chappell, Crockett, Jacoubovitch & McGuire, Juror Responses to Prere-
corded Videotape Trial Presentations in California and Ohio. 26 HASTINGS L.J. 975 (1975).
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An interdisciplinary approach could produce a well-formulated qualita-
tive difference test. Both the law and social science are powerless to oper-
ate effectively without specification; yet neither the law nor social science
has identified with sufficient specificity the conditions under which
televised trials create a denial of due process. References to "specific
showings of evidence" will not suffice. This does not insinuate that either
the press or the judiciary have abused the qualitative difference test. The
point is simply that no such standard actually exists.
The qualitative difference test holds the potential to become a useful
standard when dealing with cameras in the courtroom. But the test is in-
complete. It remains to establish usable criteria for determining what ef-
fects are caused by the presence of cameras in the courtroom and which of
those effects may cause a denial of due process.
